. Nosofsky (1996) compared a linear decision-bound model with the generalized context model (GCM) in their ability to account for categorization data from experiments that used integral-or separable-dimension stimuli and required selective attention or attention to both dimensions. McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) found support for the GCM and concluded that decision-bound theory needs to incorporate assumptions about selective attention. In this commentary it is argued that (a) unlike the GCM, decision-bound theory provides a framework for independently investigating perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention; (b) the effect of stimulus integrality on the form of the optimal decision bound is misinterpreted; (c) averaged data is biased against decision-bound theory and toward the GCM; (d) many a priori predictions of the GCM are violated empirically; and (e) exemplar theory has lost much of its initial theoretical structure. McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) examined the effects of selective attention on categorization performance. They compared a linear decision-bound model with the generalized context model (GCM) in terms of their ability to account for data from two categorization experiments. Each experiment included a condition in which selective attention seemed reasonable and a condition in which attention to both dimensions was necessary. One experiment used stimuli composed of separable dimensions, and the other used stimuli composed of integral dimensions. McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued that the GCM provided the better account of the data and concluded that decision-bound theory is inadequate because it fails to incorporate assumptions about selective attention.
McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) examined the effects of selective attention on categorization performance. They compared a linear decision-bound model with the generalized context model (GCM) in terms of their ability to account for data from two categorization experiments. Each experiment included a condition in which selective attention seemed reasonable and a condition in which attention to both dimensions was necessary. One experiment used stimuli composed of separable dimensions, and the other used stimuli composed of integral dimensions. McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued that the GCM provided the better account of the data and concluded that decision-bound theory is inadequate because it fails to incorporate assumptions about selective attention.
In this comment, we make five points. First, decisionbound theory does incorporate notions of selective attention, and unlike the GCM, it allows independent investigation of perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention. Second, McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) misinterpreted assumptions in decision-bound theory about the influence of the integrality-separability distinction on the form of the optimal decision bound. As a result, they derived incorrect predictions from decision-bound theory. Third, averaged W. Todd Maddox, Cognitive Systems Group, Department of Psychology, Arizona State University; E Gregory Ashby, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to W. Todd Maddox, who is now at the Department of Psychology, Mezes Hall 330, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712. Electronic mail may be sent via Interact to maddox@psy.utexas.edu. data are biased against decision-bound theory and toward the GCM, even when the individual observer data are described perfectly by decision-bound theory. Thus, the tests reported by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) between the GCM and the decision-bound models that used averaged data are invalid. Fourth, many of the predictions that McKinley and Nosofsky claimed are a priori predictions of the GCM have been violated frequently in past applications of the GCM. Fifth, exemplar theory has lost much of the rich and crisp theoretical structure that made it such an attractive theory of human categorization when first formalized by Medin and Schaffer (1978) . McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) analyzed results from two types of categorization conditions. In the orthogonal conditions, only one of the two stimulus components was relevant, and a reasonable strategy was to ignore the irrelevant component of the stimulus and to attend only to the relevant component. In the diagonal conditions, both components were relevant, and a reasonable strategy was to allocate attention to both stimulus components. Experiment 1 investigated the performance of observers in orthogonal and diagonal classification problems with Munsell color chips that varied in saturation and brightness. These stimuli are thought to be composed of integral dimensions (Garner, 1974) . A large number of observers participated in a single experimental session, and the averaged data were analyzed. In Experiment 2, orthogonal and diagonal classification problems were also constructed, but the stimuli were circles of varying diameter with an embedded radial line of varying orientation (hereafter referred to as the Shepard circles; Shepard, 1964) . These stimuli are thought to be composed of separable dimensions (Garner & Felfoldy, 1970) . In Experiment 2, each observer completed several experimental sessions, and single-observer analyses were performed. McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued for the validity of an exemplar-similarity approach to predicting classification performance. In particular, they were interested in contrasting the performance of Nosofsky's (1986) GCM with a simple version of the linear decision-bound model (the general linear classifier, GLC; Ashby, 1992; Maddox, 1995a; . The GCM combines a multidimensional scaling (MDS) model of the psychological representation of the stimuli with Medin and Schaffer's (1978) context model of classification. Thus, the GCM assumes that an observer's experience with a stimulus over the course of an entire experiment can be represented by a single point in a multidimensional psychological space. The GCM also assumes that classification decisions are based on similarity comparisons between the target stimulus and all exemplars stored in memory. However, similarity relations among exemplars can be modified by selective attention processes. In particular, selective attention results in a stretching of the psychological space along the attended axis and a shrinking of the psychological space along the unattended axis.
In orthogonal classification problems where a reasonable strategy is to ignore one component of the stimulus, the GCM assumes that the selective attention mechanism is invoked, thus stretching the space along the relevant dimension and leading to improved classification performance. In diagonal classification problems where both stimulus components are relevant, selective attention should not improve performance and thus should not be invoked. Within the framework of the GCM, it is also assumed that the efficiency of this selective attention mechanism is strongly influenced by the integrality or separability of the psychological dimensions. With separable-dimension stimuli efficient selective attention is possible, whereas with integral-dimension stimuli selective attention is less efficient. These changes in the psychological representation may be due to changes in perceptual processes, decisional processes, or both. McKinley and Nosofsky (1996; see also Nosofsky, 1987) argued that the changes they observed are "probably best viewed as changes in a judgmental 'cognitive' similarity rather than as changes in perceptual confusability" (p. 315).
These assumptions about selective attention led McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) to the following predictions. First, in the orthogonal conditions, observers should invoke the selective attention mechanism. Second, selective attention should be highly efficient for stimuli composed of separable dimensions (as in Experiment 2) but less efficient for stimuli composed of integral dimensions (as in Experiment 1). Third, the selective attention mechanism should not be invoked in the diagonal conditions, regardless of the integrality or separability of the stimulus dimensions. In addition, McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued that decision-bound theory predicts that observers will use linear decision bounds in the orthogonal and the diagonal conditions whether the stimuli are composed of integral dimensions or separable dimensions. They found the GCM to outperform a simple linear decision-bound model in both the orthogonal and the diagonal conditions when the stimuli were composed of integral dimensions and in the diagonal condition when the stimuli were composed of separable dimensions.
In the orthogonal condition with separable-dimension stimuli, the fits of both models were comparable. On the basis of these results, McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) concluded that the GCM predicted a qualitative contrast in the classification of critical transfer patterns across the orthogonal and diagonal conditions in each experiment, whereas the (linear decisionbound model) did not .... Apparently, decision-bound theorists need to add assumptions about the role of selective attention to psychological dimensions to predict the conditions in which linear boundaries will yield good fits to data. (p. 312)
We turn now to a discussion of each of the five major points outlined at the beginning of this article.
Modeling Selective Attention
McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued for the importance of selective attention processes in categorization. In the GCM, selective attention stretches the psychological space along the attended dimension. This has the effect of increasing the distance between the point representations of the stimuli along the attended dimension. Under certain experimental conditions, the effect of selective attention on the psychological space may be due to changes in perceptual processes; under other conditions the effect may be due to changes in decisional processes. These two forms of selective attention are nonidentifiable in the GCM because the effects of selective attention, whether due to perceptual or decisional processes, are modeled in the same way, namely, as a stretching or shrinking of the psychological dimensions. However, McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued that in their experiments the effects of selective attention are most likely due to changes in cognitive processes.
Decision-bound models of classification (Ashby, 1992; Maddox, 1995a; assume that because of stimulus noise, sensory noise, and perceptual noise, there is trial-by-trial variability in the perceptual representation of all stimuli. In other words, point representations are replaced with distributional representations. Thus, to represent an observer's complete experience with a stimulus over the course of an entire experiment, decision-bound models specify a mean percept on each psychological dimension, the amount of trial-bytrial variability in the percept along each dimension, and the trial-by-trial correlation between the perceived values along each pair of dimensions. Observers are assumed to assign categorization responses to different regions of the perceptual space. As a result, to categorize an object, the observer determines in which region the percept falls and then emits the associated response. The partition between competing response regions is called the decision bound. Ashby and Perrin (1988) showed that the act of stretching a dimension in a point-representation model (like the GCM) is mathematically equivalent to decreasing the associated perceptual variances in decision-bound theory. The notion that attention reduces perceptual variability has a long history in signal-detection theory (Bralda & Durlach, 1972; Durlach & Braida, 1969; Luce & Green, 1978; Luce& Nosofsky, 1984; Macmillan, Goldberg, & Braida, 1988) . Notice that although the cause of selective attention on the psychological space in the GCM may be perceptual or decisional, within the framework of decision-bound theory the mathematically equivalent effect is clearly perceptual in nature. As such, within the framework of decision-bound theory, this should be referred to as perceptual selective attention. An example is shown in Figure 1 . Figure la depicts a situation in which there is no perceptual selective attention. Figure lb depicts a case in which more attention is allocated to Dimension 1, thereby decreasing the Dimension 1 perceptual variances.
A decisional form of selective attention can also be represented within the framework of decision-bound theory. Decisional selective attention results when the decision bound satisfies a property Ashby and Townsend (1986) called decisional separability. Decisional separability holds if the observer's decision about the level of one stimulus component does not depend on the perceived value of any other components. Decisional separability is associated with decision bounds that are parallel to the dimensional axes and is a form of decisional selective attention because the observer's decision is based only on the perceived value along a single perceptual dimension.
Figure lb depicts a case in which the decision bound satisfies decisional separability. In decision-bound theory, decisional separability (and thus decisional selective attention) is logically unrelated to perceptual selective attention, although empirically the two conditions may be correlated (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Maddox & Ashby, 1996) . The idea that there might be separate perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention has widespread support. For example, Posner and Peterson (1990) postulated separate (but interacting) anterior and posterior attentional networks. Their posterior network is perceptual in nature, whereas their anterior network serves executive functions and is closely related to our decisional selective attention. Unfortunately, within the framework of the GCM these two forms of selective attention are nonidentifiable because they have the same effect, namely, a stretching and shrinking of the psychological space. Alternatively, within the framework of decision-bound theory, perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention are identifiable, with perceptual forms of selective attention modeled by the perceptual variance parameters and decisional forms by the decision-bound parameters. As a result, decision-bound theory provides a powerful theoretical framework within which to study the effects of perceptual and decisional selective attention on categorization performance.
McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) concluded from their results that "decision bound theorists need to add assumptions about the role of selective attention to psychological dimensions to predict the conditions in which linear boundaries will yield good fits to data" (p. 312). Because McKinley and Nosofsky argued that the cause of selective attention in their experiments was decisional in nature, we assume they were asking for assumptions about the role of decisional separability (i.e., decisional selective attention) within the framework of decision-bound theory. In other words, they would like an answer to the question, When is decisional separability likely to hold?
The answer to this question can be found in many of our previous articles. In particular, we have hypothesized that the observer's decision bound will often be of the same form as the optimal bound (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby & Lee, 1991 Ashby & Maddox, 1990 Maddox, 1995a; . Thus, when decisional separability is optimal, observers are more likely to use decisional separability. As we show in the next section, the optimal decision bound is determined by the perceptual variances and correlations as well as by the perceptual means. Because perceptual integrality implies a fairly complex perceptual representation, decisional separability is less likely when the stimulus dimensions are perceptually integral (e.g., Ashby & Lee, 1991 Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Maddox, 1992) .
We wish to state for the record that McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) article had a major impact on our thinking about perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention. Although the distinction is inherent in decisionbound theory and has been clear to us for some time, McKinley and Nosofsky's article made us realize that we need to be extremely careful to make explicit what form of selective attention is being addressed. The issue of selective attention within the framework of decision-bound theory has been confused for quite some time, and we accept much of the blame for the confusion. We welcome the opportunity to clarify our position.
Perhaps the major confusion has been in the use of one term, selective attention, for two qualitatively different types of selective attention: perceptual and decisional. Within the framework of the GCM, these two forms of selective attention are nonidentifiable, and so possibly Nosofsky and colleagues are correct to use one term. However, within the framework of decision-bound theory, these two forms of selective attention are identifiable, and so decision-bound theorists need to be very clear as to which form of selective attention is being discussed.
As stated earlier, although the effects of both perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention are identical in the GCM, the mathematically equivalent effect in decisionbound theory is clearly perceptual in nature. Thus, for example, when Ashby and Lee (1991) argued that "shifts in selective attention may occur, but these often play a minor role in the identification-categorization relation" (p. 167), they were referring to the effects of selective attention on the perceptual representation--that is, on the perceptual form of selective attention. Ashby and Lee (1991) argued that "the most important difference between identification and categorization is that the two require very different sets of decision bounds .... It should be instructive then to see how well we can account for the categorization data without appealing to the concept of selective attention" (p. 167). Clearly Ashby and Lee distinguished between decisional processes, which they felt were critical, and (perceptual) selective attention, which they felt played a minor role. 1 Even so, in the future, decision-bound theorists need to be more clear. In support of the notion that perceptual selective attention plays a relatively minor role in most categorization tasks, Maddox and Ashby (1993) showed that a decision-bound model with equal variances on each dimension (i.e., a model that assumed no perceptual selective attention) gave a better account than the GCM of several data sets collected by Nosofsky (1986 Nosofsky ( , 1989 .
To conclude, we feel there is much overlap between our position and that of McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) . We agree that (a) decision processes are very important predictors of classification performance, (b) decisional separability implies a decisional form of selective attention, and (c) decisional separability is less likely to hold with perceptually integral dimensions. Our positions differ only in the theoretical approach that is better suited to the investigation of selective attention processes. Whereas McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) favored an exemplar-similarity approach that treats perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention as nonidentifiable, we favor a multidimensional signal-detection approach, namely, decision-bound theory, that contains parameters associated with separate perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention, each of which is uniquely identifiable. This does not preclude the possibility that both perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention may be operative at the same time (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Maddox & Ashby, 1996) . The misunderstanding as to the definitions of selective attention within the two theoretical approaches has existed for some time. Our hope is that this commentary makes clear our position.
Integrality, Separability, and the Form of the Optimal Decision Bound
Decision-Bound Theory
Within the framework of decision-bound theory, the distinction between separability and integrality is fundamental and is defined at the level of perceptual representation and decisional processing (see Ashby, 1989; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Maddox, 1992; Maddox & Ashby, 1996) . Ashby and Townsend (1986) distinguished between two types of separability: perceptual and decisional. Decisional separability was defined in the last section. Perceptual separability occurs if the perceptual effects (i.e., the distribution of percepts) of a particular dimension are unaffected by the level of the other dimension. Technically, Dimension 1 is perceptually separable from Dimension 2 if the marginal distribution of percepts along Dimension 1 does not change when the level of Dimension 2 changes. In Figure 2a , Dimension 1 is perceptually separable from Dimension 2. In Figure 2b , however, perceptual separability is violated because the mean perceptual effect for Level 1 (and Level 2) of Dimension 1 differs across levels of Dimension 2. This particularly simple form of perceptual integrality is called a mean-shift integrality Maddox, 1992) . Recent evidence suggests that mean-shift integrality may be common (Kingston & Macmillan, 1995; Mounts & Melara, 1995; Wickens & Olzak, 1992) .
Although we might expect perceptual and decisional separability to be correlated empirically, logically they are unrelated (Ashby, 1989) . It is logically possible for either to hold in the absence of the other. In fact, even if an assumption of optimality is added--that is, that the observer chooses a decision bound that maximizes accuracy--decisional separability is not implied by perceptual separability (e,g., Ashby & Townsend, 1986) .
The shape and location of the decision bound that maximizes categorization accuracy (i.e., the optimal decision bound) is determined by the category structure and by the perceptual distribution parameters for each category exemplar (i.e., the perceptual means and the perceptual variance-covariance matrix for each category exemplar; Ashby, 1992; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Green & Swets, 1974) . In all but a few special cases, the optimal decision bound is nonlinear. The relationship among the distribution parameters determines the perceptual separability or perceptual integrality of a set of stimulus dimensions, so, by 1 Ashby and Lee (1991) obtained good fits of the categorization data from a model that assumed changes only in the decision bounds across identification and categorization. Interestingly, though, Ashby and Lee (1991) also found evidence for perceptual selective attention. This result is interesting because it suggests that changes in perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention might characterize the identification-categorization relationship (see also Maddox & Ashby, 1996) . This finding strengthens our belief that it is important to use a model that contains parameters associated with separate perceptual and decisional forms of selective attention, each of which is uniquely identifiable. definition, the form of the optimal decision bound depends directly on whether the stimuli are composed of integral or separable dimensions. Within the context of their two experiments, McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued that decision-bound theory predicts the use of linear bounds in all experimental conditions. This is incorrect because it ignores the rich theoretical structure within decision-bound theory for representing the differences between stimuli composed of integral dimensions and those composed of separable dimensions. In fact, the article that introduced decision-bound (or general recognition) theory was entitled "Varieties of Perceptual Independence" (Ashby & Townsend, 1986 ). Ashby and Townsend showed that many different types of perceptual interaction, including integrality and separability, lead to very different forms of perceptual representation. With integral-dimension stimuli and a categorization task in which a horizontal or vertical bound separates the exemplars in the stimulus space, decision-bound theory virtually always predicts a failure of decisional selective attention (i.e., decisional separability; e.g., Ashby & Lee, 1991 Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Maddox, 1992) .
Why did McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) incorrectly assume that decision-bound theory predicts the same decision bounds for integral-dimension and separable-dimension stimuli? There are several possibilities. One is that within the GCM, integral-dimension and separable-dimension stimuli are represented identically; the only difference is the efficiency of the selective attention mechanism. For example, Figures 3a and 3b of McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) show that increasing brightness has no effect on perceived saturation and that increasing saturation has no effect on brightness. The resulting rectangular array of points is also a hallmark of the GCM representation of separable-dimension stimuli (e.g., see Figure 3 of Nosofsky, 1989) . In contrast, in decision-bound theory, integral-dimension and separabledimension stimuli must, by definition, be represented differently.
A second possibility has to do with the fact that many applications of decision-bound theory to categorization data (using both integral-dimension and separable-dimension stimuli) have assumed a very simple perceptual representation in which the perceptual variance is equal across dimensions and stimuli and is uncorrelated (analogous to the perceptual distributions outlined in McKinley and Nosofsky, 1996, Figure 1 ). Possibly, this led the authors to conclude that this was the perceptual representation always assumed by decision-bound theory. If so, let us clarify our position by quoting from our previous work. We earlier stated that "this is the simplest perceptual representation allowed in decisionbound theory, and in light of the results of Ashby and Lee (1991; see Figure 6, p. 161) , it is surely incorrect" (Maddox & Ashby, 1993, p. 60) . In addition, we explained why we chose this perceptual representation. "First, Ashby and Perrin (1988) showed that these distributional assumptions produced a dissimilarity metric that is equivalent to the measure used by the GCM and DEM [Deterministic Exemplar Model; when equal amounts of attention are allocated to each stimulus dimension (i.e., when w = .5; see Equation 7) .... Second, such a simple perceptual representation forces the decision-bound to account for most of the variance in the data" (Maddox & Ashby, 1993, pp. 60-61) . In short, we chose these distributional assumptions not because we thought they were correct but because they allowed us to test hypotheses about the need for perceptual selective attention and to determine the importance of decision bounds in categorization. Several other applications of decision-bound theory have not made this assumption. For example, Ashby and Lee (1991) and Maddox and Ashby (1996) used identification confusions to estimate the perceptual distribution parameters for a set of stimuli. These perceptual distributions were then used to predict categorization performance with the same stimuli. In both studies, the perceptual distributions were quite complex (see Ashby, 1996, Figure 5, and Lee, 1991, Figure 6) , violating the uncorrelated, equal-variance assumptions of Maddox and Ashby (1993) .
A third possibility has to do with our earlier statements about the types of decision bounds that might be used in Garner's (1974) speeded classification tasks. Although a detailed discussion of our earlier work is beyond the scope of the present article, suffice it to say that our goal was to interpret Gamer's traditional speeded classification tests of separability and integrality within the framework of decisionbound theory in the hope of providing a rigorous theoretical foundation for these operational tests. Perhaps the most important result we obtained was that decisional separability is necessary for the speeded classification tests to be valid indicators of perceptual separability. Although decisional separability is rarely optimal when perceptual integrality holds, we argued that "it is plausible to expect a naive subject to adopt decisional separability ... regardless of whether the components are perceptually separable" (Ashby & Maddox, 1994, p. A.~4) . Although McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) did not reference this work, perhaps they interpreted these statements as applicable to their task.
Unfortunately, there are several fundamental differences between Gamer's speeded classification task and the categorization experiments conducted by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) . First, and perhaps most important, the instructions differ considerably in speeded classification and categorization. In speeded classification, the observer is informed of the categorization rule prior to each experimental condition. We made this point very clear when we stated that, one could interpret the task instructions as a plea for decisional separability. That is, a subject who is told to: "Respond '2' when the stimulus appears to have a high value on dimension A" might assume that these instructions require setting a criterion on the perceptual dimension associated with component A and responding '2' whenever the percept has a value on that dimension exceeding the criterion. (Ashby & Maddox, 1994, p. 443) In other words, the observer is instructed to ignore one dimension of the stimulus before the experiment ever begins and thus use a decision bound that satisfies decisional separability. In the categorization tasks conducted by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) , this was not the case. Rather, observers were required to learn the categorization rule from experience. Second, the stimulus structure is much simpler in speeded classification. In a typical speeded classification task, there are only 4 unique stimuli constructed from the factorial combination of two levels along two stimulus components. In McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) experiments, however, there were at least 15 stimuli, constructed from up to six levels along a stimulus component. Finally, although we stated that it is plausible that observers will adopt decisional separability , a rigorous empirical test of this hypothesis is yet to be conducted.
To summarize, the integrality-separability distinction is fundamental in decision-bound theory. The distinction is made at the level of perceptual and decisional processing. The nature of the perceptual representation (i.e., whether perceptual separability or perceptual integrality holds) has a direct influence on the form of the optimal bound but does not constrain the types of bounds observers can learn (e.g., observers are not constrained to use decisional separability when perceptual separability is satisfied). Therefore, it is incorrect to argue that decision-bound theory predicts the same decision bounds in the orthogonal conditions of Nosofsky (1989) and McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) . In addition, although the orthogonal and diagonal conditions appear to be related by means of a simple rotation, this applies only to the stimulus coordinates and thus does not guarantee that the optimal decision bound will be of the same form in both conditions. In short, without knowledge of the perceptual distribution parameters that describe Munsell color chips, we have no way of determining the shape of the optimal decision hound. However, it is highly unlikely that the optimal bound is linear. A discussion of the integrality-separability distinction within the framework of the GCM follows.
Generalized Context Model
McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued at several points that the effects of integrality-separability on the observable data are in accord with predictions of the GCM and in opposition to predictions of decision-bound theory. As stated earlier, the GCM is an MDS-based exemplar model. The distinction between integral-dimension and separabledimension stimuli has a long history within the MDS literature (e.g., Garner, 1974; Shepard, 1964) . In particular, the type of distance metric that best fits proximity data has been found to depend critically on the nature of the stimulus dimensions. When the stimuli are composed of separable dimensions, the city-block metric tends to fit best, and when the stimuli are composed of integral dimensions, the Euclidean metric tends to fit best. Thus, one might expect the use of the city-block metric when applying the GCM to data collected using separable-dimension stimuli and the use of the Euclidean metric when applying the GCM to data collected using integral-dimension stimuli. Table 1 presents the stimulus dimensions and distance metric used in applications of the GCM to several experiments conducted by Nosofsky and his colleagues. Two points stand out. First, the Euclidean metric is consistently used in applications of the GCM to integral-dimension stimuli. Second, in some cases the city-block metric is assumed for separable-dimension stimuli, but in other cases the Euclidean metric is assumed. In the two most recent applications of the GeM to separable-dimension stimuli, the Euclidean metric is assumed. 2 How, then, is the integrality-separability distinction represented in the GCM? As suggested in Table 1 (ignore, for now, the column headed Similarity function) and by the fact that the GCM uses the same rectangular representations for stimuli composed of integral dimensions and separable dimensions, it appears that the integrality-separability distinction does not reside in the nature of the psychological space but rather in the efficiency with which selective 2 Fits of the GCM reported by Maddox and Ashby (1993) also assumed a Euclidean metric for separable-dimension stimuli. The GCM with a city-block metric was applied to the data but was found to provide an inferior account. Although the MDS theory of integrality-separability requires the application of the city-block metric for separable-dimension stimuli, our goal was to compare the best fitting version of the GCM with decision-bound theory. Shepard (1986) argued that the inconsistency in the best fitting distance metric found in applications of the GCM to separable-dimension stimuli occurs because the perceptual representation assumed by the CJCM is incorrect, primarily because of its failure to account for effects of confusability. Ennis (1988) showed formally that Shepard's (1986) argument is valid if the perceptual representation is modeled as in decision-bound theory. Specifically, Ennis (1988; Ennis, Palen, & Mullen, 1988) showed that if the perceptual representation of decision-bound theory is correct (in which a stimulus is represented by a multivariate normal distribution) and a city-block metric is used to determine within-trial similarity, then when the GCM is fit to the resulting data, a Euclidean metric will be supported when confusability is high and a city-block metric when confusability is low. This concurs nicely with the data outlined in Table 1 . For example, the Shepard circles used in Nosofsky, Clare and Shin (1989) , for which a city-block metric provided the best fit, have much lower confusability than the Shepard circles used in Nosofsky (1985 Nosofsky ( , 1986 Nosofsky ( , 1989 , for which a Euclidean metric provided the best fit. Thus, whereas the GCM does not consistently associate the city-block distance metric with separable stimulus dimensions, the new model developed by Ennis (1988; Ennis et al., 1988) does establish this association.
To summarize, within the framework of the GCM, the integrality-separability distinction seems unclear. In some cases the Euclidean distance metric is used with integraldimension stimuli and the city-block metric with separabledimension stimuli (e.g., Nosofsky, 1987; Nosofsky et al., 1989) . In other cases, however, the Euclidean metric is assumed for both integral-dimension and separable-dimension stimuli (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995 Nosofsky, 1985 Nosofsky, , 1986 Nosofsky, , 1989 . One possibility is that these discrepant results occur because the perceptual representation of decision-bound theory is more accurate than that assumed by the GCM, especially with confusable stimuli. Whatever the reason, in current applications of the GeM, the integralityseparability distinction is assumed only to affect the efficiency of selective attention mechanisms that serve to operate on and modify the psychological space in certain categorization conditions.
Averaging Across Observers
It is common in psychological research to average across observers when analyzing data. In many cases, this averaging process affects only the measurement error and does not alter the structure of the data in any systematic way (e.g., Estes, 1956) . In other situations, however, the averaging operation might alter the structure of the data in such a way that the model that accurately describes the individual observer performance provides a poor account of the aggregate data. An even worse situation arises when the averaging operation alters the structure of the data in such a way that an invalid model (i.e., a model that does not describe the performance of the individual observer) provides a better account of the aggregate data than does the correct model (i.e., the model that does describe the individual observer performance). This presents a serious problem because the researcher might accept the invalid model as providing an accurate description of individual observer performance. Ashby, Maddox, and Lee (1994) examined the influence of the averaging operation on fits of similarity ratings that used MDS (e.g., Kruskal, 1964a Kruskal, , 1964b Shepard, 1962a Shepard, , 1962b Torgerson, 1958) and on fits of identification data that used the similarity choice model (SCM; Luce, 1963; Shepard, 1957) . Similarity ratings were generated (by means of Monte Carlo simulation) from a model that was incompatible with the traditional distance-based MDS model (e.g., Kruskal, 1964a Kruskal, , 1964b Shepard, 1962a Shepard, , 1962b Torgerson, 1958) . Specifically, similarity ratings were generated from a model that set R < 1 (from the Minkowski R metric). As a result, the traditional distance-based MDS model that assumes R >-1 provided a poor account of the individual observer data. However, the model that generated the individual observer data (i.e., the model that assumed R < 1) provided a poor account of the averaged data, and the distance-based MDS model (i.e., the model that assumed R -> 1) provided an excellent account of the averaged data. 3 Similar results were obtained for the identification analyses. Specifically, poor fits of the SCM were obtained for individual observer data (generated from a decision-bound model), but excellent fits of the SCM were obtained for the averaged data. Because the GCM is closely related to the SCM (i.e., both are based on the same relative goodness rule) and assumes an MDS-based psychological representation, these analyses are directly relevant to applications of the GCM to averaged data.
McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) Experiment 1 analyses were performed on averaged data. McKinley and Nosofsky acknowledged that the good fits of the GCM relative to the linear decision-bound model might be an artifact of the averaging process; however, they argued that it is important to remember that the linear decision-bound models provided excellent fits to the data obtained from Nosofsky's (1989) orthogonal conditions. These experiments were virtually identical to the orthogonal conditions reported here, the key difference being that the stimuli from the 1989 studies were composed of highly separable dimensions, whereas the present stimuli were composed of integral dimensions. Arguments about averaging data do not seem to account for this fundamental difference in the fits of the models across the two experiments, whereas the ideas about selective attention provide a straightforward explanation. (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1996, pp. 305-306) The authors were correct in stating that the linear decisionbound model provided good fits of Nosofsky's (1989) orthogonal data and that the key difference between the two data sets was in the separability-integrality of the stimulus dimensions. 4 However, as outlined in the last section, the perceptual representation, and thus the optimal decisionbound, is (in general) much different for the perceptually integral stimuli used by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) . The fact that a linear decision-bound model provided excellent fits to the data obtained from Nosofsky's (1989) orthogonal condition by using perceptually separable dimension stimuli provides little (if any) insight into the nature of the decision bound for perceptually integral stimulus dimensions. In addition, given the fact that perceptual integrality is associated with complex perceptual interactions, it is most likely that the optimal decision rule will be highly nonlinear. For the sake of argument, though, let us assume that McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) were correct in stating that decision-bound theory predicts the use of linear decision bounds by each individual observer in Nosofsky's (1989) and McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996, Experiment 1) studies. However, in line with the theoretical underpinnings of decision-bound theory, let us assume that perceptual separability held for Nosofsky's (1989) stimuli and that perceptual integrality held for McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996, Experiment 1) stimuli. The issue at hand is to determine whether, under these constraints, it is reasonable that a linear decision bound would provide a good fit to Nosofsky's (1989) averaged data but a poor fit to McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996, Experiment 1) averaged data, even though the individual observers in both cases used a linear decision bound. In other words, we wish to test the validity of McKinley and Nosofsky's claim that averaging does not account for the difference in fits of the decision-bound models across experiments. To address this issue Maddox (1995b) described a series of Monte Carlo simulations similar in spirit to those reported by . This unpublished study is reported in full in the Appendix.
One of the major goals was to determine whether the distinction between perceptual separability and perceptual integrality influenced the outcome of the averaging operation. In part, Maddox (1995b) was interested in determining whether an increase in the complexity of the perceptual representation (i.e., cases in which perceptual integrality held) would cause the averaging operation to alter the data in such a way that the "valid" model would provide a poor fit to the averaged data but an "invalid" model would provide a good fit to the averaged data. In all the simulations, the valid model (i.e., the model used to generate the data) assumed that each observer used a linear decision bound. In other words, each "hypothetical" observer behaved as if he or she compared the perceptual effect on each trial with a fixed linear decision bound that partitioned the perceptual space into separate Category A and B response regions. Each hypothetical observer differed only in the exact slope and intercept that described their particular linear decision bound. Two different data sets were simulated. Both contained separate orthogonal and diagonal categorization conditions. The first simulation, which assumed perceptual 3 This result is most likely due to the fact that the averaging operation appeared to eliminate violations of the triangle inequality. When R < 1, the triangle inequality is violated. In the hypothetical individual observer data, there were an average of 33 triangle inequality violations (out of a possible 84) in each data set. In the averaged data, however, there were no violations of the triangle inequality. The traditional MDS-based model that assumes R --> 1 predicts no violations of the triangle inequality and thus accounted for the averaged data quite well (see , for more details).
4 Maddox and Ashby (1993) also compared the performance of the decision-bound models with the GCM when applied to categorization data collect by Nosofsky (1986) . The categorization conditions and stimuli were nearly identical to those in Nosofsky (1989) ; the critical difference was that Nosofsky (1986) used highly experienced observers and analyzed data at the individual observer level, whereas Nosofsky (1989) used novice observers and analyzed the averaged data. Although McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) were correct in stating that the decision-bound models provided good fits to Nosofsky's (1989) data, it is worth mentioning that the model fits differed considerably across data sets (i.e., Nosofsky, 1986 , vs. Nosofsky, 1989 . Specifically, the fits of the GCM improved considerably when applied to Nosofsky's (1989) novice, averaged data and were quite poor when applied to Nosofsky's (1986) experienced, single-observer data. In addition, the decision-bound models generally outperformed the GCM when applied to the experienced, single-observer data, yielding large improvements in fit when the categorization problem was complex (cf. Maddox & Ashby, 1993, Tables 6 and 9) . When applied to the novice, averaged data, however, the model fits were quite similar. Thus, although the fits of the decision-bound model were good and compared well with the CJCM when applied to the averaged, novice data, the decision-bound models were much better and were generally favored over the GCM when applied to the experienced, individual observer data. separability, was patterned after an experiment reported by Nosofsky (1989) . The second simulation assumed perceptual integrality and was patterned after Experiment 1 of McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) . Maddox (1995b) fit the GLC, the CA~ (general quadratic classifier), and the GCM to each simulated data set. The models were fit separately to the data from each individual simulated observer and to the data averaged across observers. The assumptions of the GLC and the GQC were identical to those made by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) and by Maddox and Ashby (1993) . Specifically, both models assumed perceptual independence and equal perceptual variances across dimensions and stimuli, and either a linear (GLC) or quadratic (GQC) decision bound. For the simulated data that assumed perceptual separability, this version of the GLC is the correct model because it was used to generate the data. However, for the data that satisfied perceptual integrality, this version of the GLC is incorrect. The integral data were generated from a version of the GLC that assumed a more complex perceptual representation (i.e., perceptual independence was violated and the perceptual variances were not equal across stimuli and dimensions): The simpler models were used in an attempt to replicate the data analyses of McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) . What follows is a summary of the findings. Maddox (1995b) found several interesting results. First, in general, when each hypothetical observer used a decision bound that was approximately optimal, the fits of all models to the averaged data were very similar to those of the individual observer data. This result was expected on the basis of Ashby and Alfonso-Reese's (1995) work, which showed that the equivocality contour predicted by the GCM (i.e., the contour for which the predicted probability of responding 2 is equal to the predicted probability of responding 1) is very close to the optimal decision bound. The GCM parameters allow the model enough flexibility to account for small deviations from optimality. Second, when the observers used decision bounds that were nonoptimal, the averaging operation generally led to a large improvement in fit for the GCM and a decrement in fit for the decision-bound models. In other words, whereas the decisionbound model that generated the individual observer data was clearly superior to the GCM for each individual observer, the superiority was strikingly reduced when the data were averaged across observers. 6 Third, the simulation results showed that the effects of averaging depended strongly on whether the stimuli were perceptually integral or perceptually separable. The decision-bound models used by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) and in Maddox's (1995b) simulations all assume equal, uncorrelated perceptual variances across dimensions and stimuli. Of course, when perceptual integrality holds, as in McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) Experiment 1, these assumptions are severely violated. Maddox (1995b) found that when perceptual separability was violated, a quadratic decision-bound model enjoyed a consistent advantage over the linear decision-bound model. Interestingly, this advantage occurred for the individual observer and for the averaged data.
These results suggest that if perceptual integrality holds and the observer uses a linear decision bound, then the uncorrelated, equal-variance version of the quadratic decision-bound model will outperform the same version of the linear decision-bound model. This is most likely a function of the incorrect perceptual representation assumptions being made by these models. Apparently, the extra parameters of the quadratic decision-bound model allow it to account for some of the error that results from the incorrect perceptual representation assumption. This is an important result because McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) found the quadratic decision-bound model to provide a large improvement in fit over the linear decision-bound model. In fact, they used this finding to argue against the validity of decision-bound theory, because they reasoned that the a priori prediction of decision-bound theory was the use of a linear decision bound. In their words, "Both models [the GCM and the GQC] captured the observed contrast across conditions in the classification of the critical transfer patterns, although the GCM predicts this pattern a priori, whereas the GQC does not" (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1996, p. 304) . In summary, the effect of averaging was most severe when observers used suboptimal bounds and was essentially absent when responding was nearly optimal. How do these results relate with the empirical finding that the linear decision-bound model provided good accounts of the averaged Nosofsky (1989) data but provided a poor account of the averaged McKinley and Nosofsky (1996, Experiment 1) data? Two issues appear to be relevant. First, because Nosofsky's (1989) stimuli were (or were nearly) perceptually separable, the uncorrelated, equal-variance assumption was nearly correct. McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) stimuli, however, were highly perceptually integral, and so the uncorrelated, equal-variance assumption was severely vio-5 As outlined in the Appendix, the complex perceptually integral representation was generated by transforming from the discrete Munsell color space to the continuous valued CIE XFZ color space. This approach was taken because the stimuli used by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996, Experiment 1) were Munsell color chips. It is important to note, however, that the effects of averaging observed in these simulations are not isolated to this specific complex perceptual representation~that is, to these particular covariance matrices (see Figure A2 ). In fact, several arbitrary perceptually integral representations were also examined and in general yielded results similar to those outlined here.
6 Interestingly, the ability of the GCM to mimic the singleobserver data was affected most by the magnitude of the deviation from the equivocality contour. For example, consider the perceptual representation outlined in the lower left of Figure A2 . Notice that the equivocality contour is fairly linear for intermediate values along Dimension 1 but "bends up" for small values along Dimension 1. When a hypothetical observer uses a decision bound with a slightly negative slope, the model is flexible enough to mimic these data because the equivocality contour bends in this direction. However, when a hypothetical observer uses a decision bound with a slightly positive slope, the model has great difficulty mimicking the data because the equivocality contour bends in the opposite direction. When data from these two types of observers are averaged, any detrimental effects of positive decision-bound slopes are counteracted, and the model is readily able to account for the averaged data. lated. Thus, the simple fact that the perceptual representation assumptions were more reasonable in Nosofsky's (1989) study than in McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) study should account for some of the difference in the fits of the decision-bound models. Second, it is likely that decisional separability is nearly optimal in Nosofsky's (1989) study but is not as close to optimal in McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) study. In addition, because of the perceptually separable nature of the Shepard circles, it is likely that the optimal decision bound in Nosofsky's (1989) study was easy to verbalize and thus was learned more quickly by each observer. In McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) study, however, the optimal bound was not verbalizable (because of the perceptually integral nature of the stimuli) and thus there would be a greater likelihood of individual differences in the form of the decision bound.
Taken together, these simulation results underscore the importance of performing single-observer analyses, and they point to the dangers of making incorrect perceptual representation assumptions when comparing decision-bound and exemplar models of categorization. In addition, they provide a serious challenge to the validity of any inferences that might be drawn from McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) Experiment 1.
A Priori Predictions of the GCM
At several points, McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) argued that the explicit selective attention mechanism within the GCM leads to several important a priori predictions that are not predicted a priori by the decision-bound models. Specifically, they argued that the selective attention mechanism is invoked only in the orthogonal conditions and thus leads the GCM to predict "a qualitative contrast in the classification of critical transfer patterns across the orthogonal and diagonal conditions in each experiment" (p. 312) such that certain transfer stimuli are classified into the selective attention category in the orthogonal condition and in the overall similarity category in the diagonal condition.
We see several problems with this argument. First, in the GCM, the predicted probability that the transfer stimuli are classified into one or the other category also depends on the scaling constant c, as well as the attention weight w. To show this, we examined the GCM predictions with respect to the transfer stimuli shown in McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) Figure 4 when no selective attention was assumed (i.e., when w = .5) and the value of the scaling constant c changes. Interestingly, we found that the probability with which transfer items T3 and T4 were classified into Category B increased, even though no selective attention was assumed. With a small amount of selective attention (e.g., w = .6) these probabilities were increased even more. Figure 4 of McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) shows how increasing the value of w affects the predicted classification probabilities for the critical transfer stimuli. McKinley and Nosofsky generated Figure 4 with a value of c that was smaller than the smallest estimated value of c from Experiment 1 (they assumed c = 2 in Figure 4 , and their smallest estimate was c = 2.417). This had the effect of increasing the perceived importance of the w parameter in accounting for the data from the transfer stimuli. Of course, we are not arguing that c behaves like w. Rather, we are arguing that it is misleading to claim that data from the transfer stimuli can be accounted for simply by a priori predictions about w.
Second, and perhaps more important, in many applications of the GCM, the w parameter was allowed to differ significantly from .5 even in conditions in which selective attention (as defined in the GCM) should not be invoked. The GCM hypothesizes that selective attention (i.e., w near 0 or 1) occurs in conditions in which one stimulus dimension is more important than the other and does not occur in conditions in which both stimulus dimensions are equally important. To test this hypothesis, we examined the w estimates from the four orthogonal and the four diagonal conditions of McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) Experiments 1 and 2, as well as from several previously published orthogonal and diagonal conditions. Specifically, goodnessof-fit tests were performed between the full model in which w is a free parameter and a restricted model in which w = .5. The w estimates from the full model are presented in Table 2 . Cases in which the full model (w free) provided a statistically significant improvement in fit over the restricted model (w = .5) are denoted by an asterisk. In line with the a priori predictions of the GCM, the w estimates tend to be extreme Note. An asterisk signifies that the full model, in which w was a free parameter, provided a significant improvement in fit over the restricted version of the model, in which nondifferential selective attention was assumed (i.e., w = .5). Saturation (A) and Saturation (B) denote two different orthogonal categorization problems (see Nosofsky, 1987, for details) . aThese estimates are from the best fitting augmented versions of the generalized context model (GCM). bThe reported values are the average of the individual observer w values. The restricted version of the GCM with nondifferential selective attention was not applied to these data.
(i.e., closer to 0 or 1) in the orthogonal conditions, and the value of w was significantly different from .5 in all the orthogonal conditions outlined in Table 2 . However, in six of the eight diagonal conditions, selective attention also appears to be necessary--that is, the full model with w as a free parameter provided a significant improvement in fit over the restricted model with w = .5. 7 In short, the GCM requires selective attention to predict data from orthogonal conditions, but often it also requires selective attention in conditions in which the two stimulus components are equally important.
Current Status of Exemplar Theory
We have devoted much of this commentary to clarifying the predictions of decision-bound theory. In this section we focus on exemplar theory. In particular, we argue that although I0 years ago exemplar theory was a rich and useful theory, in the past decade it has been weakened so much that it has lost much of its ability to make a priori predictions about categorization behavior.
When Nosofsky (1986) published his generalization of Merlin and Schaffer's (1978) context model, exemplar theory gave a rich and detailed account of human categorization processes. The theory rested on the following four specific assumptions.
1. Summed similarity (Estes, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) . On each trial, the observer sums the similarities between the target stimulus and the memory representation of each exemplar from every relevant category.
2. Product rule (e.g., Estes, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978) . Similarity is defined as the product of the component similarities on each dimension. In their seminal text, Smith and Medin (1981) argued that the product rule set the context model apart from other popular models of categorization, for example, because it allows the model to be sensitive to correlational structure (e.g., Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981) .
3. Probability matching (Estes, 1986; Merlin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) . The probability that a stimulus is assigned to a category equals the relative magnitude of the evidence favoring that category. (Nosofsky, 1986) . Stimuli are represented as points in a multidimensional psychological space and similarity is computed with a city-block distance metric if the stimuli are composed of separable dimensions and with a Euclidean metric if the stimuli are composed of integral dimensions.
Multidimensional scaling theory of integral-dimension and separable-dimension stimuli
These assumptions allowed researchers to make specific and detailed predictions about performance in a wide variety of categorization tasks. As such, exemplar theory stimulated a huge amount of new research into categorization phenomena. Unfortunately, current versions of exemplar theory lack the precision of the earlier versions of the theory. In particular, during the last decade, exemplar theorists have abandoned all four of these assumptions. We consider each assumption in turn, beginning with Assumption 4 and working backward.
Although point representations have been used almost exclusively in applications of exemplar theory, in several places Nosofsky has acknowledged the superiority of distributional representations, like those assumed by decisionbound theory. For example, Nosofsky (1988a) noted that "instead of representing an exemplar as a single point in a psychological space (as assumed by Nosofsky, 1986) , a more appropriate model would represent each exemplar as a distribution of points in the psychological space" (p. 412). Later in the same article he said, "I believe the distributional approach to representing exemplars holds more general utility for theories of similarity and categorization" (p. 413). With regard to the representation of integral and separable dimensions within MDS, Table 1 shows that in recent applications of the GCM, the Euclidean metric is assumed, regardless of whether the stimuli are composed of integral or separable dimensions. As a result, as noted earlier, the GCM no longer includes the long-standing tradition of associating city-block distance with separable-dimension stimuli and Euclidean distance with integral-dimension stimuli.
Probability matching has been instantiated into exemplar models through the assumption that response selection follows the similarity choice model (Luce, 1963; Shepard, 1957) . Although probability matching is still frequently assumed, in many instances this assumption has been relaxed. Specifically, the GCM has been generalized in such a way that it can now account for responding that is either more or less variable than predicted by the SCM (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995 Nosofsky, 1991 Nosofsky, , 1992 . Currently, the trend is to assume probability matching only when the GCM is fit to averaged data. When the GCM is fit to single-observer data, the more general version is used. For example, this is the tack taken by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996; see also McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995) . In Experiment 1, where averaged data were analyzed, probability matching was assumed. However, in Experiment 2, where single-observer analyses were performed, probability matching was abandoned in favor of a more powerful alternative that allows responding that is more or less variable than predicted by the SCM.
In the GCM, the product rule holds when city-block distance is paired with the exponential decay similarity function or when Euclidean distance is paired with the Gaussian similarity function (Takane & Carroll, 1982) . In the original formulation of the GCM, these couplings played a prominent theoretical role. In fact, according to Nosofsky (1987) , because the MDS-based approach with these pairings "generalizes Medin and Schaffer's multiplicative similaxity rule, I refer to [the new model] as the generalized context model" (p. 90) . In a number of applications (see 7 Because we did not have the single-observer data from McKinley and Nosofsky (1996, Experiment 2), we did not conduct any tests on these data. Even so, on the basis of the average parameter values, we assumed that both orthogonal conditions and the diagonal (A) condition violated nondifferential selective attention. Table 1) , however, the Euclidean distance metric has been paired with the exponential decay similarity function (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995 Nosofsky, 1987) . Thus, it appears that the product rule, like the integral dimension/ separable dimension distinction and probability matching, is no longer a critical assumption of the theory.
The assumption that exemplar theorists have been most reluctant to abandon is that observers sum similarity to all exemplars of every relevant category. This assumption has been attacked on the basis of plausibility. For example, Myung (1994) argued that "it is hard to imagine that a 70-year-old fisherman would remember every instance of fish that he has seen when attempting to categorize an object as a fish" (p. 348). Even if the exemplar representations are not consciously retrieved, a massive amount of activation is assumed by the summed similarity assumption. Apparently, even Nosofsky now doubts the validity of this assumption. His most recent exemplar model (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997) has replaced the summed similarity assumption with an assumption that only some of the similarities (a random number) are computed on each trial. This is a more reasonable assumption but, unfortunately, little is known about the accuracy predictions of this new model, except under certain implausible parameter settings 8 (the model was developed to account for categorization response times).
Thus, all four of the assumptions that defined the GCM and made it such a powerful and attractive alternative to classical and prototype models of human categorization have now been renounced by some exemplar theorists. Unfortunately, there has been little effort to replace them with alternative assumptions that are equally crisp. Perhaps the most surprising recent development in exemplar theory, however, is the admission that exemplar theory may be valid only within a rather limited stimulus domain. Specifically, Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997) stated: "We hypothesize that exemplar-based classification processes are most likely to operate in domains involving 'integral-dimension' as opposed to 'separable-dimension' stimuli" (p. 271). Thus, from the strong and all-encompassing theory of human categorization that it was 10 years ago, exemplar theory has become a rather vague theory of how people categorize a restricted subset of stimuli.
What has caused these changes in exemplar theory? One possibility is that the competing models have gotten better at fitting the data. When exemplar models were originally developed, their main competition was from prototype theory. The exemplar models were much more flexible and powerful than the prototype models, so they could retain the four assumptions listed above and still outperform the prototype models. However, as more data were gathered and alternative models were proposed, such as the decisionbound models, it became clear that the defining assumptions would have to be relaxed to keep the exemplar models competitive.
The unfortunate consequence of these events is that today it is unclear what constitutes exemplar theory. For example, how could one falsify the GCM? If the MDS point representation is no longer valid, similarity no longer satisfies the product rule, there is no longer a relation between the psychological representation and the nature of the stimulus dimensions, and responding no longer satisfies probability matching, then what is left? Even a demonstration that observers do not sum similarity to all category exemplars apparently no longer suffices.
Summary and Conclusions
The GCM assumes a point representation for all stimuli and makes no explicit distinction (at the level of the psychological space) between integrality and separability. For these reasons, the orthogonal and diagonal categorization conditions are treated as identical, except for a simple rotation. In certain cases, though, the observed data from these two conditions differ qualitatively. To account for this qualitative difference, the GCM must postulate a change across conditions in one of its three parameters: the response bias BA, the scaling constant c, or the attention weight w,
In contrast, decision-bound theory postulates a far richer perceptual representation. It explicitly describes how the nature of this representation depends on whether the stimuli are composed of integral dimensions or separable dimensions. McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) ignored this aspect of decision-bound theory even though it has been described in many publications (Ashby, 1988; Ashby & Lee, 1991; Ashby & Maddox, 1991 Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Kadlec & Townsend, 1992; Maddox, 1992; Thomas, 1995) . Decision-bound theory also explicitly describes how the integrality-separability distinction affects decision processes. Because the perceptual representation determines the shape of the optimal bound, decision-bound theory predicts differences in performance across orthogonal and diagonal conditions and across stimuli that lie at different points along the continuum of perceptual separability and perceptual integrality. Thus, decision-bound models can account for a wide range of categorization data without postulating explicit shifts in perceptual selective attention. This is not meant to imply that perceptual selective attention is not important. Under certain conditions, we expect perceptual selective attention to reduce trial-by-trial variability in the percept. In fact, we found some support for this notion in a series of speeded classification tasks (Maddox & Ashby, 1996) . McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) based many of their arguments on results obtained from fitting decision-bound models and the GCM to data that were averaged across observers. showed that the two models on which the GCM is based--namely, MDS and the SCM both dramatically benefit from the averaging operation. Specifically, averaging changes the psychological structure of the data (by artificially increasing symmetry) in such s Nosofsky and Palmeri (1997) showed that their new exemplarbased random walk model (EBRW) makes the same accuracy predictions as the GCM when both response barriers are only 1 unit in distance from the origin. However, in all applications of the EBRW, these distances were estimated to be between 3 and 6 units. For this range of parameter values, almost nothing is known about the accuracy predictions of the EBRW. a way that MDS and the SCM are virtually guaranteed to fit the averaged data, even when they fail on the data from each individual observer. Because of this result, it is not surprising that Maddox (1995b) showed that the GCM benefits in a similar way from averaging, again at the expense of decision-bound theory. In particular, averaging across observers biases the results against decision-bound theory and in favor of the GCM, If one is interested in understanding individual categorization behavior, then single-observer analyses must be performed.
Overview
The goal of Maddox's (1995b) simulations was to investigate the effects of averaging on the fits of decision-bound models and the GCM. In all simulations it was assumed that the observer used a fixed linear decision bound; however, there were differences across observers in the exact slope and intercept of the decision bound. Each set of simulations required assumptions about the perceptual representation (i.e., whether perceptual separability or perceptual integrality was satisfied) and about the location of the decision bound (i.e., whether the bound was approximately optimal or was suboptimal). In the remainder of this section we provide an overview of the simulation approach. In the second section we detail the actual perceptual representation and the decision-bound parameters for Nosofsky's (1989) application, and in the third section we provide the same information for McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996, Experiment 1) application. In the final section we summarize the results.
The first step in the simulation approach was to specify the nature of the perceptual representation for both the perceptually separable (Nosofsky, 1989) and the perceptually integral stimulus dimensions (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1996, Experiment I) . A schematic representation of Nosofsky's (1989) Figure Ald is similar except that the variance along the orientation dimension is larger than the variance along the size dimension. The representation in Figure Ald was chosen because Nosofsky (1989) found the size dimension to be more discriminable than the orientation dimension.
Choosing the perceptual representation for the perceptually integral stimuli from McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) was somewhat more difficult. Maddox (1995b) could have chosen an arbitrary perceptual representation, such as a mean-shift or a variance-shift integrality, but it was more advantageous to use knowledge of the Munsell color system to guide the choice. Maddox's (1995b) goal was to transform from the discrete Munsell color space to a color space that was continuous and thus would allow him to specify contours of equal likelihood for each stimulus. The details of this transformation are outlined in the third section. The contours of equal likelihood for McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) brightness and diagonal (A) conditions are depicted in the bottom portion of Figure A2 . A schematic of these two conditions is displayed in the top portion of Figure A2 . At The second step in the simulation approach was to specify the slope and intercept of the linear decision bound used by each hypothetical observer. For each categorization condition (and perceptual representation), two types of decision-bound assumptions were examined. The first assumed each observer used an approximately optimal decision bound. The second assumed nonoptimal decision bounds, m A summary of the conditions investigated is outlined in Table A1 . The first column denotes the categorization condition; the second column, the perceptual representation assumptions; the third column, the assumptions made when the decision bound was approximately optimal; and the fourth column, the assumptions made when the decision bound was nonoptimal. An illustration of the decision-bound assumptions for the Nosofsky (1989) and the McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) simulations are depicted in Figures A3 and A4 , respectively. First consider cases in which the decision bound is approximately optimal. In the orthogo-AI It became apparent while searching for a suitable transformation from the discrete Munsell color space to a continuous valued color space that several possible transformations existed. Although the covariance matrices that would result from various transformations would clearly differ, as long as the resulting representation was characterized by complex variance and dependence relations, the results of the simulations should be similar. In fact, Maddox investigated several arbitrary perceptually integral representations, such as variance-shift integralities, before discovering the approach outlined in this article. In general, the results were similar to those reported here.
A2 It is worth noting that although some observers were assumed to use nonoptimal decision bounds, all observers with low accuracy were excluded. In fact, in line with Nosofsky (1989) , all observers were excluded whose accuracy was less than 80% in the orthogonal conditions and 70% in the diagonal condition. In the McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) simulations, all observers were excluded whose accuracy was less than 85% in the orthogonal condition and 70% in the diagonal condition. nal conditions decisional selective attention is assumed to be approximately optimal. In the diagonal conditions, however, some form of decisional integration is assumed. In Nosofsky's (1989) diagonal condition, the approximately optimal decision bound had a unit slope and a zero intercept. In McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) diagonal condition, no linear decision bound was approximately optimal. Therefore, only nonoptimal decision bounds were investigated. For the nonoptimal bound conditions Maddox chose bounds that seemed reasonable but not optimal. In fact, in some cases Maddox examined a situation in which half of the observers used one linear bound and the other half used a different linear bound. For example, in Nosofsky's (1989) diagonal condition, Maddox (1995b) assumed half of the observers allocated more (decisional) attention to orientation (i.e., used a bound with a slope > 1), and the other half allocated more (decisional) attention to size (i.e., used a bound with a slope <1). The idea that averaged categorization data might contain a mixture of data collected from individuals using different decision strategies forms the basis for some recent categorization models such as Nosofsky, Palmed, and McKinley's (1994) RULEX model.
Because the goal of these simulations was to determine how averaging influenced the model's ability to account for the data, it was crucial that some reasonable individual differences among observers be incorporated. Although individual differences can be specified at one of many levels, Maddox (1995b) felt that the most reasonable strategy was to assume that each observer used a slightly different decision bound. The decision-bound parameters specified in Table AI (and depicted in Figures A3 and A4 ) might be better termed the population decision-bound parameters. Each hypothetical observer used a slightly different bound that was determined as follows: Figure A3 . Decision-bound assumptions for the Monte Carlo simulations of Nosofsky (1989) . The 1 and 2 denote exemplars assigned to Categories 1 and 2, respectively.
Basic Assumptions
1. Each simulation consisted of 10 hypothetical observers. 2. The perceptual representation (i.e., means and covariance matrix for each stimulus) was constant across observers. 3, Each stimulus was presented 200 times. In other words, for each hypothetical observer, 200 random samples were taken from each perceptual distribution.
Specifics of Nosofsky (1989) Simulations
Perceptual Representation Assumptions 1. Mean perceptual effects. The perceptual means were set to the relevant stimulus level. For example, the stimulus at Level 1 along both stimulus dimensions had a mean perceptual effect of (1,1). The stimulus at Level 1 along Dimension 1 and Level 2 along Dimension 2 had a mean perceptual effect of (1,2), and so on.
Perceptually separable, o'21 perceptual representation (see FigureAlc)
. For this series of simulations, ¢h = ¢r2 = .5. 3. Perceptually separable, ~rl > or2 perceptual representation (see Figure Ald) . For this series of simulations, ~rl = .65, or2 = .35. This condition was investigated because Nosofsky (1989) found discriminability difference across dimensions.
Decision-Bound Assumptions
I. Orthogonal condition a. Approximately optimal decision bound i. Simulation Set I: slope --0, intercept = 2.5. ii. Simulation Set 2: slope = 0; Observers I-5, intercept = 2; Observers 6--10, intercept = 3. iii. For both sets of simulations and for all observers, the slope remained fixed at 0. The intercept for each observer was obtained by taking a random sample from a normal distribution with a mean as defined above, and tri~t~pt = .4, where O'intcrc ~ represents the standard deviation for the intercept. b. Nonoptimal decision bound i. All procedures were identical except that the slope was not held fixed at 0; rather, the slope for each observer was obtained by taking a random sample from a .normal distribution with a mean of 0 and (;slop c = .2. 2. Diagonal condition a. Approximately optimal decision bound i. Slope = 1, intercept = 0.
ii. The slope (and intercept) for each observer was obtained by taking a random sample from a normal distribution. For the slope, the mean was I and C%jope = .2; for the intercept, the mean was 0 and O'intercep t = .4. b. Nonoptimal decision bound i. Simulation Set 1: Observers 1-5, slope = 0.5, intercept = 1.25; Observers 6-10, slope = 2, intercept = -2.5. ii. Simulation Set 2: Observers 1-5, slope = 0.5, intercept = 1.5; Observers 6-10, slope = 2, intercept = -3. iii. Simulation Set 3: observers I-5, slope = 0.5, intercept = 1.75; Observers 6-10, slope = 2, intercept = -2.5. iv. For all simulations, the slope (and intercept) for each observer was obtained by taking a random sample from a normal distribution, with trslope = .2, and cr~ = .4.
Specifics of McKinley and Nosofsky (1996, Experiment 1) Simulations

Perceptual Representation Assumptions
This set of simulations focused on the orthogonal and diagonal (A) category structures used by McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) .
The stimuli were iso-hue Munsell color chips that varied in saturation and brightness. The goal was to use current vision research to transform from the discrete Munsell color space to a color space that was continuous and thus would allow a rigorous description of the contours of equal likelihood for each stimulus (Brainard, 1995) . The steps were as follows:
1. Transform the Munsell coordinates to the CIE Luv uniform color space. Luv is a uniform color space because equal distances in the Luv space are approximately perceptually equal. The transformation from Munsell to Luv was accomplished relative to CIE Illuminant C and is a nonlinear transformation (see Brainard, 1995; Wyszecki & Stiles, 1982) . The result was a set of Luv coordinates, one for each Munsell stimulus. 2. Generate an isodiscrimination surface for each stimulus in the CIE Luv space. Because equal distances are approximately perceptually equal in Luv, the isodiscrimination surface was a sphere. 3. Transform each isodiscrimination sphere (in the CIE Luv space) to an isodiscrimination ellipse in the traditional CIE XYZ space. Because the elliptical nature of the XYZ isodiscrimination curves was first discovered by Macadam (1942) , these are generally referred to as Macadam ellipses.
4. Because the contours of equal likelihood for a multivariate normal distribution are always elliptical, the next step was to estimate the parameters of a trivariate normal distribution for each Macadam ellipse. The result was a set of trivariate normal distributions, one for each Munsell stimulus. 5. The mean vectors for each trivariate normal distribution were approximately coplanar. In other words, when the Munsell stimulus coordinates were transformed to the CIE XYZ space, they all fell on a plane through XYZ This result was expected because McKinley and Nosofsky's (1996) stimuli were iso-hue, differing only in saturation and brightness. Although hue is not directly related to X, Y, or Zin isolation, each hue is represented by a plane through XYZ space. 6. In light of this fact and to simplify the problem, the trivariate normal distributions were projected onto this iso-hue plane, and a simple rotation was applied so that the resulting perceptual representation was as similar to the Munsell values as possible (see Figure A2 ). In honor of Macadam (1942) , we call this the Macadam color space.
7. The axes in this Macadam color space (see lower panels of Figure A2 ) are denoted by the labels Dimension 1 and Dimension 2. These arbitrary labels were used to make clear that the Macadam dimensions differ from the X, Y, and Z dimensions of the CIE color space. Even so, notice that the Dimension 2 values in the Macadam space are very similar to the brightness values in the Munsell space. This obtains for two reasons. First, brightness in the Munsell system is analogous to Y in the CIE XYZ space. In other words, Munsell stimuli of a fixed brightness are represented in the CIE XYZ space by a fixed Y value. Second, the projection and rotation, outlined above, preserved the relationship among the Yvalues in XFZ space. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the Dimension 2 values in the Macadam color space as directly related to the brightness values in the MunseU system. One additional caveat regarding the McKinley and Nosofsky (1996, Experiment 1) simulations needs mention. When applying the models to the diagonal condition data, Transfer Items 3-5 were excluded. These items were excluded because reasonable GCM parameter values for all training exemplars and Transfer Items 1 and 2 yielded GCM predictions for Transfer Items 3-5 that were undefined (i.e., the summed similarity to Category A and Category B was zero, leading to an undefined prediction). Although decisionbound-model predictions could be generated for these transfer items, the fact that the GCM predictions were undefined necessitated exclusion of these items from all analyses. No simulations were conducted that used approximately optimal decision bounds because the perceptual representation is complex, and no linear decision bound yields optimal performance levels. ii. Slope = 1.25, intercept = -24. iii. As before, the slope and intercept for each observer was obtained by taking a random sample from a normal distribution, with the mean defined above and (raor, = .4, and crinter ~ = 4.0.
Decision-Bound Assumptions
Simulation Results
The GLC, GQC, and GCM were applied to the data from each individual observer and to the aggregate data by using a maximum likelihood procedure. The results for the Nosofsky (1989) and the McKinley and Nosofsky (1996) simulations are presented in Figures A5 and A6 , respectively. In each case, the smaller the value along the ordinate, the better the fit of the model. The three bars on the left of each figure represent the (averaged) individual observer fits, and the three bars on the right represent the fits of the averaged data. The results are summarized in the main body of this article.
(Appendix continues) Figure A5 . Goodness-of-fit ( -l n L ) values for the Nosofsky (1989) simulations. GLC = general linear classifier; GQC ----general quadratic classifier; GCM = generalized context model; so ave = single-observer average; ave obs = average observer. Figure A6 . Goodness-of-fit (-lnL) values for the McKinley and Nosofsky (1996, Experiment 1) simulations. GLC = general linear classifier; GQC = general quadratic classifier; GCM = generalized context model; so ave = single-observer average; ave obs = average observer.
Received December 18, 1995 Revision received November 4, 1996 Accepted November 21, 1996 •
